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By Bennett l. Gershman *
Rules ofevidence are designed to bring about just and infonned
decisions. One ofthese rules, the hearsay rule, is designed to ensure
thatjuries receive reliable evidence, and that out-of-court statements
ordinarily are inadmissible. Prosecutors are well aware of these
evidentiary restrictions, but occasionally seek to circumvent them.
The author describes methods used bysome prosecutors to manipu-
late the hearsay rule and thereby distort the truth-finding process of
the trial.
A prosecutor's trial functions are regulated by a broad artay of
constitutional, statutory, common-law, and ethical proscriptions
that .seek to minimize prejudice to a defendant and assure him a
fair trial. Some prosecutors, however, frod these rules too
confming, and occasionally seek to circumvent them in a variety
of ways. These methods include proving the defendant's bad
character, using inflammatory tactics, violating the defendant's
constitutional rights, and eliciting inadmissible and prejudicial
evidence. 'This article discusses one of the trial tactics "that
seems to be enjoying of late wide circulation at the prosecutorial
council fires, "2 the presentation of inadmissible hearsay evi-
dence.
<,As every trial lawyer knows, hearsay evidence is excluded
because it is considered unreliable. 3 Prosecutors are well aware
, Charles A. Frueauff Research Professor, Pace UniversitySchoolofLaw, White
Plains, N. Y.
I For a detailed discussion of the various tactics used by prosecutors to prejudice
. a defendant's fair trial rights, see Bennett L Gershman, Prosecutorial Misconduct
§§ 9.1 et seq. (1994 Supp.).
2 Zemo v. State, 646 A.2d 1050,1053 (Md. 1994) (Moylan, J.).
3 The focus of this article is on the prosecutor's trial conduct in presenting
inadmissible hearsay evidence. This is not to suggest that such conduct is limited to
prosecutors. Defense lawyers engage in similar conduct. See, e.g., United States v.
Fay, 668 F.2d 375 (8th Cir. 1981). However, without condoning defense miscon-
duct, it bears repeating that a prosecutor's ethical obligations differ significantly
from those ofdefense counsel. The prosecutor is obligated to seek truth and to "do
justice." See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.8 Cmt. (1) (1983)
(describing prosecutors as "minister[s] of justice"); Model Code of Professional
Responsibility EC7-13 (1981) (stating that prosecutors must "seek justice"); ABA
Standards for CriminaIJustice § 3-1.2(c) (3d ed. 1993) ("The duty ofthe prosecutor




ofthe restrictions on the use of such evidence,' but have devised
ways to avoid the rule and to offer inadmissible hearsay through
the "backdoor."5 Convictions have been reversed when an
appellate court finds that such prosecutorial conduct violated the
defendant's constitutional right to confrontation and the right
to a fair trial. Some courts and commentators focus on the
prosecutor's subjective intent, and find a violation when the
prosecutor has acted in bad faith to purposefully subvert the
hearsay rule.' Other courts, however, do not require a showing
is imposed upon defense counsel. Indeed, defense counsel may have an affirmative
duty that is at odds with the ascertainment of truth and justice. In an oft-quoted
passage in his cOncurring opinion in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 256-258
(1967), Justice White observed:
Law enforcement officers have the obligation to convict the guilty and to make
sure they do not convict the innocent. They must be dedicated to making the
criminal trial a procedure for the ascertainment of the true facts surrounding
the commission of the crime. To this extent, our so-called adversary system is
not adversary at all; nor should it be. But defense counsel has no comparable
obligation to ascertain or present the truth. Our system assigns him a different
mission. He must be and is interested in preventing the conviction of the
innocent, but, absent a voluntary plea of guilty, we also insist that he defend his
client whether he is innocent or guilty. The Stlite has the obligation to present
the evidence. Defense counsel need present nothing, even if he knows what the
truth is. He need not furnish any witnesses to the police, or reveal any
confidences of his client, or furnish any other information to help theprosecu-
tion's case. Ifhe can confuse a witness, even a truthful one, or make him appear
ata disadvantage, unsure or indecisive, that will be his normal course. Our
interest in not convicting the innocent permits counsel to put the Stlite to its
proof, to put the States' case in the worst possible light, regardless of what he
thinks or knows to be the truth. Undoubtedly there are some limits which
defense counsel must observe but more often than not, defense counsel will
cross-examine a prosecution witness, and impeach him if he can, even if he
thinks the witoess is telling the truth, just as he will attempt to destroy a witoess
who he thinks is lying. In this respect, as part of ()ur modified adversary system
and as part of the duty imposed on the most honorable defense counsel, we
countenance or require conduct which in many instances has little, if any,
relation to the search for truth.
• McCormick on Evidence § 245, at 426-428 (John W. Strong ed., 4thed. 1992).
, The term "backdooring" has been used by courts and commentators to describe
this tactic of evidence manipulation. See Goldsmith v. Witkowski, 981 F.2d 697,
704 (4th CiI. 1992); State v. Gage, 302 N.W.2d 793,799 (S.D. 1981); Richard H.
Underwood & William H. Fortune, Trial Ethics § 12.8 (1990 supp.).
6 See United States v. Kane, 944 F.2d 1406 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Peterman, 841 F.2d 1474 (10th Cir. 1988); United States v. DeLillo, 620 F.2d 939
(2d CiI. 1980); Michael H. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence § 607.3, at
416 (1989 supp.).. Some courts find a violation when the prosecutor's "primary
purpose" is to present inadmissible evidence. See United States v. Gomez-Gallardo,
915 F.2d 553,555 (9th CiI.1990); United States v. Hogan, 763 F.2d 697,702 (5th
CiI. 1985). Other courts suggest that the ·prosecutor's "sole purpose" must be to
present inadmissible evidence. See United States v. Johnson, 802 F.2d 1459, 1466
(D.C. Cir. 1986); Spence v. State, 583 A.2d 715,717 (Md. 1991). Undue reliance
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of prosecutorial bad faith, These courts apply an objective test
and conclude that, regardless of the prosecutor's intent, the
conduct is improper when it distorts the jury's ability to fairly
evaluate the evidence. 7 The following discussion describes the
various tactics employed by prosecutors in presenting inadmissi- .'
ble hearsay evidence to the jury. 8 .
A Subterfuge: Impeachment With Prior
Inconsistent Statement
Virtually every federal circuit and many state courts have
adopted a rule that "a prosecutor may not introduce evidence
under the guise of impeachment for the primary purpose of
placing before the jury substantive evidence which is not other·
. wise admissible."9 In the prototypical case, the prosecutor calls
a witness who has made a statement prior to trial that incriminates
the defendant but who has retracted that statement before trial.
Knowing of the retracti0!l,lo but desiring to place the original
by the courts on the prosecutor's subjective intent, however, generates confusion
and inconsistent application of rules, and should be abandoned in favor of an
objective test. See text accompanying notes 48-51, infra.
7 United States v. Ince, 21 F.2d 576,580 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. Reyes,
18 F.3d 65,69 (2d Cir. 1994).
• For other instances ofprosecutorial manipulation of hearsay, see United States
v. Hall, 9.89 F.2d 711 (4th Cir. 1993) ("egregious example of artful cross"
examination" by reading to witness privileged statement); United States v. Danzey,
594 F .2d 905 (2d Cir. 1979) (eliciting co-defendant's confession with references to
defendant redacted but unmistakable); United States v. Check, 582 F.2d 668 (2d
Cir. 1978) (prosecutor "aUdaciously" elicited hearsay through the "artifice" of
having witness to incriminating conversation restrict his testimony to his half of the
conversation); People v. Russ, 589 N.E.2d 375 (N. Y. 1992) (blatant misconduct in
introducing inadmissible grand jury testimony of witness). But see United States v.
Eisen, 974 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1992) (impeachment of hostile government witnesses
admissible as negative inference evidence in constructing prosecutor's case).
• United States v. Peterman, 841F.2d 1474, 1479 (lOth Cir. 1988). See also
McCormick on Evidence § 38, at 52 (John' W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992); Don
Johnsen, "hopeachment With an Unsworn Prior Inconsistent Statement as Subter-
fuge," 28 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 295 (1987). The leading federal case is United
States v. Morlang, 531 F.2d 183 (4th Cir. 1975). For recent cases reversing
convictions, see United States v. Ince, 21 F.3d 576 (4th Cir.. 1994); United States
v. Gomez-Gallardo, 915 F.2d 553 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Hogan, 763
F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1985); Bradley v. State, 636 A.2d 999 (Md. 1994); Spence v,
State, 583 A.2d 715 (Md. 1991); State v. Hunt, 378 S.E.2d 754 (N.C. 1989); State
v. Bell, 362 S.E.2d 288 (N.C. App. 1987); State v. Gage, 302 N.W.2d 793 (S.D.
1981).
" Courts have frequently ruled that when the prosecutor is surprised by the
witness's turnabout, he is entitled to much greater latitude in impeaching the witness.
See United States v. Patterson, 23 F.3d 1239 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Webster, 734 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1984). Many of these courts would also require
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inculpatory statement before the jury,the prosecutor puts the
witness on the stand, questions the witness about the earlier
statement, and, after the witness denies having made the state-
ment, calls the person to whom the prior statement was made-
usually a police officer ofgovernment agent-to elicit proof of
the statement under the pretense of impeaching the witness-
declarant.
The impropriety ofsuch conduct is not immediately apparent.
Clearly, the rules ofevidence in many jurisdictions, most notably
in the federal courts, authorize a party to impeach the testimony
of his or her own witness." Moreover, the evidence is, in fact,
being received not as substantiveproofbut only for impeachment.
Further, the judge routinely gives the jury a limiting instruction
that cautions against misusing the proof for an improper pur-
pose." Finally, the witness may be committing perjury, anq the
prosecutor is sorely tempted to prevent what appears to be an
obstruction of justice. Nevertheless, the prosecutor's zeal needs
to be tempered with professionally responsible conduct. As Judge
Richard Posnerofthe Seventh Circuit CourtofAppeals observed:
But it would be an abuse of the rule [allowing a party to attack the
credibility of his own witness1, in a criminal case, for the prosecution to
call a witness that it knew would not give it useful evidence, just so it
could introduce hearsay evidence against the defendant in the hope that
the jury would miss the subtle distinction between. impeachment and
SUbstantive evidence-or, if it didn't miss it, would ignore it. The
purpose would not be to impeach the witness but to put in hearsay as
substantive evidence against the defendant. 13
The theory of misconduct in subterfuge cases is grounded in
principles of fairness. I ' Just as iUs unfair for a prosecutor to
the prosecutor to demonstrate that he has been affirmatively "harriled" by the .
witness's recantation. See United States v. Patterson, 23 F.3d 1239 (7th Cir. 1994);
United States v. Kane, 944 F.2d 1406 (7th Cir. 1991). Other courts, however, would
limit the prosecutor's impeachment under such circumstances to the cancellation of
any adverse answers by which the prosecutor was surprised. See United States v.
Gomez-Gallardo, 915 F.2d 553, 555 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v, Crouch, 731
F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir.1984); United States v. Shoupe, 548 F.2d 636, 643 (6th
Cit. ·1977). The latter decisions clearly reflect the better rule.
" Fed. R. Evid. 607 ("The credibility ofa witness may be attacked by any party,
including the party calling the. witness").
" See FED. R. EVlD. 105.
" United States v. Webster, 734 F.2d 1191,1l92 (7th Cir. 1984).
,,' United States v. Morlang, 531 F.2d 183, 190 (4th Cir. 1975) ("men should
not be allowed to be convicted on the basis of unsworn testimony"). But see
McCormick on Evidence § 38, at 52 (John W. Strong .ed., 4th ed.. 1992) ("[AI rule
against the showing of prior inconsistent statements of one's 'own witness to aid in
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knowingly offer false evidence,"it is also unfair for a prosecutor
to knowingly offer inadmissible evidence. '6 Courts find the
prosecutor's state ofntindto.be relevant in both situations. As the
Supreme Court observed, instances of this type ofprosecutorial
behavior involve a "colTUptionof the truth-seeking function of
the trial process. "11 Discovering the prosecutor's sUbjective
intent, however, can be a troublesome task. This is most apparent
when the witness who is sought to be impeached gives useful
evidence that helps the prosecutor's case.
Consider in this regard the following case. 18 The defendant is
charged with kidnapping a victim at gunpoint, forcing her into
her automobile, and robbing her. In order to place the defendant
in the stolen car at the time of the kidnapping,. the prosecutor
introduces into evidence the victim's telephone bill, which shows
that a call was made from her car phone shortly after the
kidnapping. The prosecutor then calls witness A who testifies
that his phone number matches a phone number on the biII, and
further testifies that irideed he received a telephone call from the
defendant at a time when the car would have been stolen. The
prosecutor then elicits a denial from A that he had a conversation
with Detective B, and also a denial that he told Detective B that
the defendant bragged about stealing a car and kidnapping a
woman. The prosecutor clearly expected A's denials because he
interviewed A before trial and knew that A would deny that he
had a conversation with Detective B. Nevertheless, the prosecu-
tor calls Detective B who testifies that he had a conversation with
A lIJld thatA told himthat the defendant bragged about committing
the crime.
ClearIy,A helps the prosecutor's case to the extent that he
evaluating the testimony of the witness is a serious obstruction to the ascertainment
oftruth").
"Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1,6 (1967).
" See ABA Standards for Criminal Justice § 3-5.6(b) (3d ed. 1993) ("A prosecu-
tor should not knowingly and for the purpose of bringing inadmissible matter to the •
attention of the judge or jury offer iuadmissible evidence"). This rule also applies
to defense attorneys. See ABA Standards for Criminal Justice § 4-7.5(b) (3d ed.
1993) ("Defense counsel should not knowingly and for the pUl'poseof bringing
inadmissible matter to the attention of the judge or jury offer inadmissible evi-
dence."). The rule also applies in civil cases. See Smith v. Covell, 100 Cal. App.
. 3d 947,161 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1980). .
17 Unied States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
" The hypothetical is based on Bradley v. State, 636 A.2d 999 (Md. 1994).
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pla~es the defendant in the car at the time it was stolen. However,
he also provides unhelpful testimony-he denies that he impli-
cated the defendant. It is not at all clear that the prosecutor's
primary purpose in calling A was to impeach his credibility. If
that is the test, however, then it wO\lld be difficult to fault the
prosecutor's conduct. Clearly, one of the prosecutor's purposes
in calling A was to obtain useful evidence, namely, to link the
defendant to the car. However, when the prosecutor went further
and questioned A about his conversation with Detective B, the
prosecutor then was engaging in a separate area ofinquiry. Those
questions, one could argue, were not being asked for the purpose
ofeliciting useful and legitimate evidence. Rather, the prosecutor
was laying the foundation in order to call B as a witness and
introduce the hearsay statement ofA through the back door.
Several courts analyze the problem by holding that the prose-
cutor should have stopped hise~amination after introducing the
admissible part of A's testimony, and refrained from going into
unfairly prejudicial territory involving inadmissible hearsay."
Other courts, however, reach a different result on similar facts,
concluding that the prosecutor's primary purpose in calling the
witness was not to impeach his credibility, and that therefore, no
misconductoccurredwh~n the prosecutor elicited the impeaching
evidence. 20
The correct approach would be to allow the prosecutor to call
the witness, and allow appropriate and relevant e~amination.
Referring to the preceding hypothetical, the prosecutor would
be able to call A as a witness and e~arnine him about the
defendant's telephone call. However, when the prosecutor seeks
to impeach A with the prior inconsistent statement, the trial court
should require the prosecutor to make an offer of proof as to the
nature of the e~pected testimony and the probative value of the
impeaching evidence. 21 The court should evaluate that offer of
proof under familiar principles of trial evidence, namely, by
" United States v. Crouch, 731 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Shoupe, 548 F.2d 636 (6th Cir. 1977); Bradley v. State, 636 A.2d 999 (Md. 1994);
Spence v. State, 583 A.2d 715 (Md. 1991).
" United States v. Palterson, 23 F.3d 1239 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Kane, 944 F.2d 1406 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Peterman, 841 F.2d 1474
(lOth Cir. 1988); United States v.DeLillo, 620 F.,2d939(2d Cir. 1980).
" United States v. Hogan, 763 F.2d697 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Crouch,
731 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1984).
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balandng the probative value of the proof against its capacity to
. create unfair prejudice. 22 The prosecutor would have to demon-
strate that attacking A's credibility was probative of an issue in
the case. The prosecutor would next have to demonstrate that
the probative value of such impeachment was not substantially.
outweighed by unfair prejudice. The prosecutor would further
have to demonstrate the propriety'of eliciting extrinsic hearsay
evidence that incriminates the defendant, particularly when it
is commonly agreed that juries misunderstand the distinction
between impeachment and substantive evidence." Because of
such potential for confusion, the statement's likely prejudicial
impact will often outweigh its probative value for impeachment
purposes, and should rarely be allowed. 24
A Pretext: Refreshing Recollection
Witnesses often claim memory lapses. Some witnesses are
honystly forgetful; others claim memory lapses in order to avoid
havingto give truthful testimony. Thereare occasions, moreover,
when the forgetful witness has previously made a statement that
is harmful to the defendant, but at trial claims not to remember
the subject matter of that statement. The prosecutor, obviously
disappointed by the witness's claimed forgetfulness, and under
the guise of refreshing the witness's recollection, occasionally
seeks to confront the witness with the previous statement~to the
point'of reciting the statement aloud in the presence of the jury-
even though the witness persists in claiming not to remember,
and steadfastly denies that his memory is being refreshed. Some
coUrts have analyzed the issue by inquiring into the prosecutor's
intent." Was the prosecutor attempting in good faith to stimulate
the memory ofan honestly forgetful, oreven recalcitrant witness?
Or was the prosecutor deliberately using the witness as a mere
"conduit" to place prejudicial hearsay evidence before the jury?
As with the impeachment cases described previously, the
" United States v. Ince, 21 F.3d 576,580-581 (4th Cir. 1994). A leading treatise
on evidence also recommends this approach. See 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger,
Weinstein's Evidence § 607[01], at 607-617 (1985).
"United States v. Webster, 734 F.2d 1191, 1192 (7th Clr. 1984).
" United States v. Ince, 21 F.3d 576,581 (4th Cir. 1994).
"United States v. Zackson, 12 F.3d 1178 (2d Clr. 1993); United States v.
Shoupe, 548 F.2d 636 (6th Cir. 1977).
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judiciary's attempt to formulate a rule of trial evidence, and to
find an evidentiary violation, based on the prosecutor's state
of mind, is highly problematic. Absent a prosecutor's frank
admission that his purpose was not to refresh the witness's
recollection but instead was to put before the jury prejudicial and
inadmissible evidence, a court would be hard-put to conclude
that the prosecutor was acting in bad faith.
Trial judges, who have the principal role of supervising an
attorney's conduct at trial, have the responsibility to closely
monitor a tactic that can easily subvert a fair trial. Judges should
ordinarily require the prosecutor to demonstrate by a specific
offer of proof that there are legitimate grounds to believe that
the attempt to refresh the witness's recollection is capable of
succeeding. The prosecutor should be required to disclose
whether he knows of any reason why the witness might be
deliberately refusing to remember. Under no circumstances
should the prosecutor be allowed to read the statement aloud in
the presence of the jury.26 The prosecutor should show the
statement to the witness, ask the witness to read the statement to
himself, and then ask the witness if the statement refreshes
the witness's memory .27 If the prosecutor seeks· to refr~sh the
witness's recollection with an oral statement that was not reduced
to writing; the jury should be excused. Based on the witness's
answers, the judgewould then be capable ofmaking adetermina-
tion-again based on considerations of relevance and unfair
prejudice-whether the prosecutor should be allowed to ask the
questions in the presence ofthe jury.
Finally, in those infrequent situations when the prosecutor's
intent is apparent from the record, the judge should forbid the
inquiry and adlllonish the prosecutor to avoid further examina-
tion. If the question has already been asked, and prejudice has
infected the trial, the judge could declare a mistrial, or strike the
damaging material and give the jury a cautionary instruction. If
the circumstances warrant, the judge could impose disciplinary
measures upon the prosecutor. Again, however, the touchstone
for finding trial error should not depend on the prosecutor's
26 United States v. Shoupe, 548 F.2d 636, 64J(6thCir. 1977). See also United
States v. Hogan, 763 F.2d 697, 700 (5th Cir.1985); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law
§ 60.35(3).
21 See Fed. R. Evid. 612.
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subjective intent. A fmding of errOr by an appellate court should
be based on an objective evaluation of the prosecutor's conduct,
and the probable impact of that conduct on the jury. After the
court has made an objective determination that the prosecutor
committed a trial violation, the court could then take into account
the prosecutor's intent in determining whether under allof the
circumstances a reversal is warrahted.
A Sham: "Background" EVidence
Prosecutors have also tried to subvert the hearsay rule under
the guise of eliciting sham "background" information about the
history of the investigation." As examples, prosecutors have
elicited from government witnesses hearsay statements made by
other participants in the crime.that incriminate the defendant,"
or other hearsay testimony that demonstrates the defendant's
involvement in other criminal activities." In United States v.
Reyes," the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a drug
conviction because of the prosecutor's improper introduction
of background evidence. The court strongly denounced the
prosecutor's conduct, and issued a cautionary warning to prose-
cutors to avoid such misconduct in the future.
In the course of questioning the U.S. customs agent who had
investigated a narcotics conspiracy in Connecticut, the prosecutor
in Reyes elicited from this witness that she had conversations
with two of the participants in the drug conspiracy after they
were arrested. The prosecutor was permitted by the trial court to
elicit from the agent that "as a result of [these] conversations,"
the agent' 'concluded that there were other individuals involved
in this criminal enterprise. ")2 The prosecutor argued, and the trial
court agreed, that such background information was necessary to
help thejury understand the agent's "state of mind," and the
." See Zerno v. State, 646 A.2d 1050, 1053 (Md. App. 1994)("It behooves us to
point out that the State is retelling the 'Old Wives' Tale' that it is somehow necessary
always to layout for the jury the course of a criminal investigation. It is a tale that
seems to be enjoying of late wide circulation at the prosecutorial council fires. It is
an apocryphal tale, however, and one that urgently needs demythologizing. ").
"United States v. Reyes, 18 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Figneroa,
750F.2d232 (2dCir. 1984).
" United States v. Hernandez, 750 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1985).




reason why she arrested the defendant. The witness then identi-
fied these other individuals by name, one of whom was the
defendant."
The court of appeals reversed the conviction. The court had
little difficulty in concluding that the prosecutor violated the
hearsay rule by introducing the cited conversation under the
pretense of legitimate background information." The "clear
message" that the prosecutor communicated to the jury, the
court said, was that the participants had admitted their role in the
conspiracy to the agent, and had also implicated the defendant
in the conspiracy. 3S The court fQund that the prosecutor had
"displayed so egregious a misunderstanding ofthe circumstances
that will justify [the admission of] background testimony from
government investigators,' '36 that the court carefully set forth the
factors that ordinarily would justify the introduction of so-calied
background proof. The court explained that such testimony is
usually allowed to clarify noncontroversial matters so that the
jury will better understand the reasons for the government's
subsequent actions; it is not a vehicle to put before the jury
inadmissible and prejudicial evidence.
The court enumerated the factors that should be considered
by the trial judge in weighing the relevance and admissibility Of
background evidence and its potential prejudice.37 Such factors
include its importance to the jury's understanding of the issues,
the extent to which it contributes to proof of the defendant's
guilt, whether the background can be adequately communicated
3' Although t1ie prosecutor had represented that he was not offering this evidence
forthe truth of the matter asserted, in summation he contended that the information
received from the co-conspirators pointed to "the people responsible for this
cocaine." [d. at 68.
" The court noted that technically no hearsay violation occurred because the trial
judge instructed the jury not to consider the out ofcourt declarations as proof of the
truth of the matters asserted. [d. The court went on:
However, when the likelihood is sufficiently high that the jury will not follow
the limiting instructions, but will treat the evidence as proof ofthe truth of the
declaration, the evidence is functionally indistinguishable from hearsay. [d.
. "[d. As in Reyes, courts carefully note when prosecutors use their closing
argument to the jury to compound and aggravate the original misconduct. See United
States v. Inee, 21 F .3d 576,584 (4th Cif. 1994); United States v. Hogan, 763 F.2d
697, 703 (5th Cir. 1985)..
"Reyes, 18 F.3d at 70.
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by other less prejudicial means, and whether the defense has
engaged in a tactic that justifiably opens the door to· such
evidence.38
The court also enumerated. several factors that should be
considered in assessing prejudice." These include whethet the
information addresses an important disputed issue at· trial,
whether the same information could be proved by other uncon-
tested evidence, whether the statement was made by a knowledge-
able declarant so that the jury would likely believe it, whether
the declarant will testify at trial, thus exposing him to cross-
examination, and whether curative instructions can protect
against misuse or prejudice.40
The court observed that prosecutors occasionally adopt the
tactic of structuring the eviqence in the form of the history of the
investigation, "because it makes the evidence more exciting and
perhaps also because it suggests a guilty verdict as a logical,
satisfying conclusion. "41 The use of this narrative device is not
improper as long as the prosecutor does not enlarge the scope of
relevant evidence by introducing out-of-court statements that are
functionally indistinguishable from hearsay.
Although the court initially concluded that the prosecutor's
conducthad been a deliberate attempt to prejudice the defendant's
rights," on rehearing, the court amended its opinion to state that
the prosecutor acted in good faith. 43 Nevertheless, the court
observed that the prosecutor's subjective intent was not relevant
in determining whether a violation had occurred; the critical
'" See United States v. Pulley, 922 F.2d 1283 (6th Cir. 1991) (testimony allowed
to rebut defense suggestion that government agent planted evidence); United Staies
v. Hawkins, 905 F.2d 1489 (11th Cir. 1990) (testimony allowed to rebut defense
suggestion that investigation designed to harass defendant).
"Reyes, 18 F.3d at 70-71.
'" See United States v. Tussa, 816 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1984) (limiting instructions
inadequate); United States v. Martin, 897 F.2d 1368 (6th Cir. 1990) (same).
" Reyes, 18.F.3d at 71.
" See slip opinion in United. States v. Reyes, dated February 17, 1994, at 1841
(prosecutor initially represented that the statements were not being offered for their
truth, but in his summation, he reversed himselfand affirmatively used the statements
for the truth of what Was stated, and also "seriously distorted and exaggerated" the
information contained in the statements). .
" The amended opinion in United Stares v. Reyes, supra, went out of its way to
absolve the prosecutor of any intent to prejudice the defendant. The court stated:
"We are assured by the Goverument and are fully convinced that the discrepancy'
between [the agent's] testimony and the summation was not intentional." Id. at 69.
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question was whether the prosecutor's conduct, objectively con-
sidered, had an adverse impact on the jury's ability to fairly
evaluate the proof. 44 The court also issued a strong warning to
prosecutors, advising them that they should alert the judge imd
defense counsel when they were about to introduce "potentially
incendiary evidence as to which there are arguable grounds for
exclusion. "45
Insinuations: Implications of Guilt
.' Closely related to the improper introduction of background
information to circumvent the hearsay rule are situations where
the prosecutor elicits testimony that involves an insinuation that
the defendant is gUilty. Such a tactic would typically involve the
following hypothetical. The prosecutor examines witness X who
has had a conversation with Y, a person who is shown to
be knowledgeable about the crime, and about the defendant's
participation in the crime. The prosecutor then would ask X the
following questions:
Q. After you had this conversation with Y, were you looking for
somebody?
A. Yes.
Q. Who were you looking for?
A. The defendant.'"
The courts find that this practice is subtly designed to circum-
vent the hearsay rule and the confrontation clause, and have
reversed convictions when sufficient prejudice is shown." By
" The court stated: "Although the mistake had innocent origins, our concern is
for its possible effect on the jury." Id.
" Id.at72.
" See Mason v. Scully, 16F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 1994); People v. Tufano, 69 A.D.2d
826,415 N.Y.S.2d 42 (1979), See also Zemov. State, 646 A.2d 1050 (Md. 1994).
" Id. From my experience, such prosecutorial practice is quite typical, particu-
larly in cases involving eyewitness identifications. The prosecutor first asks the
arresting officer whether he spoke to the eyewitness. The prosecutor then demon-
strates abundant fairness by cautioning the officer not to divulge the nature of the
conversation. The prosecutor then asks the officer whether he took any police action
following that conversation.. The officer, of course, answers' that he arrested
the defendant. Although this practice violates the hearsay rule and constitutes
impermissible bolstering of the eyewitness's. credibility, defense lawyers rarely
object, and judges rarely sustain objections when made. Either these individuals do
not understand what the prosecutor is doing, or they view the practice as a technical
misstep that does not require correction.
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asking the witness'-usually a law enforcement official-whether
he received information froman out-of-court declarant, and then '
following up that question by asking what the witness did with
that information, usually receiving the answer that he arrested
the defendant, the prosecutor impliedly introduces the substance
of the information. The witness has testified, in effect, that the
defendant was identified. as a participant in a crime. Under
these circumstances, a court is justified in concluding that the
prosecutor has planted in the jurors' minds the impression that
the witness implicated the defendant.· This is the functional
equivalent of introducing inadmissible hearsay.
Conclusion
In all instances mentioned, the prosecutor has elicited inad-
missible and unfairly prejudicial evidence. Apart from violating
ethical rules, the prosecutor's conduct has violated the defen-
dant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, and his due
process right to a fairtriaI. When the violation has sufficiently
infected the verdict, reversals have been ordered. However, the
extent to which the prosecutor in any of these cases intentionally
sought to unfairly prejudice the defendant's rights is often diffi-
cult to assess. One court has noted: "Federal evidence law does
not ask the judge, either at trial or upon appellate review, to
crawl inside the prosecutor's head to divine his or her true
motivation."48 Nevertheless, many courts appear to define a
violation as dependent, at least in part, on finding that the
prosecutor acted in bad faith. This approach is unsound. Predicat-
ing a fmding of error on the prosecutor's subjective intent is
confusing and hazardous. It is confusing because it suggests that
a fair trial depends on the prosecutor's innocent intent. This is
unsound because it is the prosecutor's conduct, not his intent,
that causes harm. Such a requirement is also hazardous because
focusing on the prosecutor's state ofmind would make it virtually
impossible, in many cases, to prove a violation.
The better approach would be to engage in a two-part inquiry.
Appellate courts should first determine whether a violation was
committed based on the kinds of objectively identifiable factors
enumerated in Reyes. 49 Such factors would carefully balance
" United States v. Inee, 21 F.3d 576, 580 (4th Cir. 1994) (emphasis in original):
" Reyes, 18 F.3d at 70-71.
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the relevance of the prosecutor's. conduct against the. prejudice
resulting from that conduct. Having concluded that a violation
was committed, courts could then appropriately attempt to aSsess
the prosecutor's subjective intent as one of the relevant factors'
in formulating a remedy. 50 When the court is able to infer from
the record that the prosecutor's purposeful design was to offer
inadmissible evidence, this determination should,appropriately
become a factor that may be considered by an appellate court in
its harmless error analysis." The prosecutor's deliberate miscon-
duct in a close case should be an aggravating factor for reversal.
so See United States v. Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315, 1318 (9th Cir. 1993) ("In
determining the proper remedy we must consider the government's willfulness in
committing the misconduct and its willingness to own up to it. "). .
" Conrts have noted that the prosecutor's intent to commit .violations may be
considered an aggravating factor for reversal. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S.
Ct. 1710, 1722 n.9 (1993) ("Our holding does not foreclose the possibility that in
an unusual case, a deliberate and especially egregious error of the trial type, or..one
that is combined with a pattern of prosecutorial misconduct, might so infect the
integrity of the proceeding as to warrant the grant of habeas relief, even if it did not
substantially influence the jury's verdict. "); United States v. Kojayan, supra; United
States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1l73, 1185 n.7 (2d Cir. 1981) (prosecutor's conduct
did not involve "instances ofdeliberate misconduct").
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